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Abstract 
Social responsibility suggests that an individual has responsibility to the 
community or society in terms of choices about behaviors. Moral responsibility 
implies a knowledge and understanding of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and the ability and 
willingness to behave morally. These debates reflect the uncertainties about how 
moral and social responsibility can be conceptualized and promoted within 
modern societies. Adrift from moral certainties and wary of merely promoting 
dominant cultural norms, the role of moral reasoning and the ability to rationally 
choose between moral values is fore fronted, but leaves us with a concern that 
such choices may lack a coherent value base or ‘morality’. The debate leaves us 
with the question as to how we promote moral and social responsibility in young 
people as part of their learning in higher education in ways that promote moral 
reasoning but also develop values and ethical stances that go beyond, and can 
contest, the social norms of the times. 
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A. Introduction 
The Crick Report states that the development of social and moral 
responsibility is a pre-requisite of citizenship, in respect of a required 
understanding of the consequences of one’s actions and the impact of these 
actions on others. And social and moral responsibility is one of the three 
themes of citizenship education outlined in the Crick Report (1998). 
Underpinning this theme is the sense that there needs to be a much clearer 
focus on developing social and moral responsibility, in terms of respect for the 
rights of others and the relationship between the individual and the 
community, in young people. As such, Crick argued that citizenship education 
requires young people to learn about moral values and to develop their ability 
to apply these in practice (1998). However, on publication of the report it was 
suggested that this theme was possibly the most controversial of the three, 
because while a moral dimension to citizenship education avoids the ‘dry’ civic 
approach, it also begs the question as to which moral values, in a pluralist 
society, young people should be learning (Pyke, 2002). 
Social responsibility suggests that an individual has responsibility to 
the community or society in terms of choices about behaviour. Moral 
responsibility implies a knowledge and understanding of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
and the ability and willingness to behave morally. As such, citizenship 
education in this area focuses on developing individuals’ ability to act as 
moral agents in their choices, intentions and actions. One aspect of this is 
legal responsibility i.e. the responsibility of a citizen to act within the law. 
However, the concept of social responsibility implies a more active role than 
remaining law-abiding, encompassing the notion that individuals should 
support and protect their societies’ interests and that they should be more 
broadly accountable to their communities for their actions. 
 
B. Social and Moral Development and Higher Education 
Sandolow (1991) states that ‘contemporary notions of morality are 
likely to regard it as a human construct’, suggesting that the current 
debate focuses not so much on absolutes about what is moral or not, but 
on how we deal with questions about what has been constructed. With 
little consensus about what is morality, educationalists are left with the 
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unenviable task of supporting the development of social and moral 
responsibility without a certain framework on which to base this process. 
In HEIs the development of social and moral responsibility through the 
transmission of values has been seen as problematical since the certainties 
of religious doctrine have diminished since the nineteenth century.  
However, some believe that the role of HEIs in this process has become 
central because of that very uncertainty. Sandolow (1991) argues that as both 
large influential conglomerates and as centres of education, HEIs have a role in 
supporting moral development. Sandolow adopts Feinberg’s (1968) view that 
collective social responsibility is the concern of large institutions and that while 
their primary purpose may not be to pursue social justice; it is still part of their 
role. In addition, the view that HEIs should be concerned with moral issues 
persists, implying that students need to be viewed as members of a community 
and not just as customers.  
Wilcox and Ebbs (1992) echo this view, stating that, as HEIs are a 
source of knowledge they are also powerful and capable of influencing social 
and economic life. Harkavy (2006), however, suggests that often the rhetoric of 
HEIs does not match outcomes. While HEIs may support the promotion of 
citizenship values and practices, the commercialisation of higher education 
‘powerfully legitimises and reinforces the pursuit of economic self-interest by 
students’ (Harkavy, 2006: 14). This begs the question as to whether higher 
education has moved in purpose from the ethical, social and character 
development that was evident in the past, to a focus on discipline-led training 
for specific employment purposes (Holland, 1991). 
This implies that students may have ‘utilitarian’ purposes for entering 
higher education, focusing on achieving qualifications for a career, rather than 
a broader educational experience (Jones and Thomas, 2005). This is confirmed 
by Kuh (2005) cited in Hersch and Schneider (2005), who reported that in the 
previous decade there was a significant decrease in the number of students 
who had reported developments in their values and ethics during their time in 
higher education. In addition, Cleaver et al (2005) found that schools 
encountered significant difficulties in involving pupils in decision-making, 
which resonates with the experience of HEIs. 
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In consumer –driven market economies, in which, the distribution of 
wealth, power and status dominate, it is difficult to see where the notion of 
individual moral responsibility may lie. Sandolow (1991) argues this point and 
suggests that HEIs are critiqued from both conservative and liberal standpoints for 
neither teaching the ethics of individual moral responsibility or a commitment to 
improving society through social change. Carr (1999: 26) proposes that there are 
two questions involved: the ‘proper direction’ of moral education and whether 
what happens in our educational institutions can improve public behaviour. The 
problem is when moral education focuses only on issues of social order and the 
inculcation of desirable social habits. Although this is generally seen as part of the 
moral educational process, it is problematical to consider an education that goes 
beyond this and tackling issues of ‘absolute and universal moral significance’.  
Moral messages are part of what takes place in HEIs and as they cannot 
be ignored, these messages must not be left to chance (Colby et al., 2003). Hersch 
and Schneider (2005) suggest that concerns about imposing moral values on 
students and the fragmentation of ethical certainties may suggest that others’ 
social and moral responsibility is “none of our businesses”.  
However, the authors discount this view on the basis that whether 
formally planned or not, being part of a higher education community will 
convey moral values and influence the development of students’ social and 
moral responsibility. If this is the case, then HEIs need to consider the ways in 
which that influence is best expressed. Wilcox and Ebbs (1992: 1) promote the 
view that it is important to analyse the ethics of the ethos of the whole 
institution, in terms of culture, customs and practices across the institutional 
structures. The key issue is the impact of this ethos on the quality of life.  
As such, ‘Responsibility for individual and social welfare is part of the 
institutional landscape, a daily occurrence manifested in decision making on all 
levels of the college or university and in the goals toward which the decision 
making is directed’. The quality of the ethical environment is significant to 
students’ overall experience of higher education and the ways in which they 
negotiate ethical issues and their own experiences. 
 
C. The Concept of Morality 
There is no doubt that the concept of morality is disputed, but Wilson 
(1990) reminds us that there is a difference between words and concepts. While 
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‘moral’ may mean different things in different contexts, the concept of morality 
is common. Hersch et al (1980: 82) state that morality has three elements: caring 
(involving social motivation and social knowledge); judging (making 
judgements about competing moral issues in relation to a consistent moral 
principle); acting (an action not being moral or immoral in itself but dependent 
on the caring and judging it is based on).  
However, defining morality is complex and Wilson draws on Plato 
and Aristotle’s deliberations to suggest that ‘the central use of ‘moral’ 
refers to a certain set of underlying dispositions, to the basic ecology….of 
human desires, emotions and deeds.’ Wilson goes on to argue that 
morality is not something we can accept or reject as suggested by 
Warnock (1971) because it underpins all human activities, even those 
concerned with non-moral issues. 
Eshelman (2004) states than any theory of moral responsibility 
should discuss the concept of moral responsibility; the criteria for being a 
moral agent; the conditions under which moral responsibility is properly 
applied (where an agent has acted with free will and is able to make 
choices) and ‘objects of responsibility ascriptions’ (those things that we 
can ascribe moral responsibility to such as actions or non-actions).  
A key part of this discussion is how morality can be determined. 
Concerns about determining the moral virtues have given way to focusing on 
trying to determine what moral behaviour is and what is not and criteria or 
principles for determining what is right and what is wrong. These questions 
have a different significance since the hegemony of the church in determining 
absolute moral values gave way to more individualistic and subjective views of 
values during the Reformation (Carr, 1999). Subsequent theories of morality 
focus more on the role of moral reasoning in achieving human goals rather than 
any absolute concept of moral values.  
As such, normative ethical theories emerged; dealing with efforts 
to determine how right and wrong can be classified and translated into 
rules for human conduct. Consequentiality theories hold that it is the 
consequences of an action that determine its morality, not the character of 
the action itself. So the morality of an action is determined retrospectively, 
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based on the outcomes of the action, and a morally positive action is one 
that produces good consequences (Eshelmen, 2004). 
Deontological theories focus on the morality of an action as inherent in 
the act itself and not in the outcomes of that act. Locke’s theory that humans have 
inalienable natural rights, which determine codes of social behaviour, 
exemplifies this. Locke argued that breaches of these inalienable rights would be 
classified as ‘wrong’ and upholding these rights would be classified as ‘right’, 
regardless of outcome. Kant also focused on the morality of action themselves 
rather than outcomes, arguing that moral acts are what any rational being could 
envisage as being universal moral laws, following on from Hobbe’s assertion 
that moral behaviour is that which unbiased others would agree was moral. 
Kant suggested that the test for the morality of an action was the categorical 
imperative i.e. that any such action could become a universal moral law. If this 
should not be the case, then the action would not be seen as moral.  
The issue that arises from both these theoretical bases is the 
implication that a value judgement about what is ‘right’ and what is 
‘wrong’ or what a ‘good’ outcome is or a ‘bad’ outcome has to be made. 
This begs the question as to whether all assumptions of morality are 
subjective and relative. Ayer (1948) argues that there is no ‘truth value’ to 
moral statements as they merely reflect the individuals’ moral beliefs and 
are entirely subjective. He suggested that moral discussion focuses on the 
advisability of accepting or rejecting an action or viewpoint but ‘discredits 
the logical authority of moral statements because the criteria for logical 
verification cannot be established’ (McPhail, 1982: 21).   
If we, then, reject the existence of universal moral laws, then are all moral 
standpoints individually or socially determined within specific cultural contexts? If 
this is the case, then the promotion of morality through education could be viewed 
as part of the socialisation of an individual into a group (community) by inculcating 
a particular culturally determined view or perspective of what morality is. McPhail 
(1982) argues that morality can stand beyond the social norms and therefore include 
both inculcation into these norms and evaluation and criticism of these. However, 
this discussion brings us back to the basic question of why we should be moral in 
terms of concern for others and their needs, and whether incentives to morality are 
intrinsic or relate to personal gratification or gain. 
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Hard determinists argue that free will is impossible in a world 
where events and actions are causally determined by a chain of prior 
occurrences, bringing into question the ability of individuals to make 
rational and free choices about their actions. Without free will, the 
individual cannot be held morally responsible for actions that are pre-
determined and outside that individual’s control.  
The debate about whether the concepts of free will and 
determinism can be held simultaneously has dominated discussion about 
whether humans can be held responsible for their actions. Compatibilists 
argue that these two apparently opposing concepts can be reconciled as 
behaviour needs to be determined, rather than random, for the actor to be 
held responsible for it. Free will is dependent on choices being 
deliberately and consciously made and the existence of choice, in that the 
actor could have acted otherwise than they did. The question then arises 
as to whether free will does exist. Can individuals really make choices and 
act freely? Sartre theorized that freedom of choice and action are the only 
criteria for moral behaviors. He argued that there can be no guidance or 
prescription for moral behaviors and choices, but that the individual acts 
morally if they choose their actions freely. Sartre distinguishes his views 
not by emphasising free choice as a central tenet of morality, but because 
he considered this was a sufficient criteria. 
Honderich suggest two models of moral responsibility. If we are 
able to make choices and are responsible for these (voluntariness and 
origination) then we have free will but this is incompatible with 
determinism. If we are only able to make choices but cannot be 
responsible for these (voluntariness only) then we have free will that is 
compatible with determinism. 
Honderich (1988) argues the significance of consequentialism, 
suggesting through his ‘Principle of Humanity’ that morality is associated 
with behaviors that helps others out of ‘bad’ lives. Morality is therefore 
linked to our actions or omissions in terms of this process as we have 
moral responsibility for ‘bad’ lives. Decision-making on whether an action 
is moral or not should be based on the consequences of that action only 
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(Anscombe, 1958). This begs the question of how the morality of specific 
actions can be judged in terms of consequences as these may be different 
for different individuals, groups or communities affected by such actions.  
Raillon (1984) argues that there can be tension between the 
individuals’ interests and the interests of the community in determining 
the morality of an action, where the outcomes differ for each. He suggests 
that individuals will be more concerned with the outcomes for themselves 
and those close to them than they will for the wider community. Downie 
(1964) also suggested that the extent of moral responsibility may be 
determined according to the social roles that individual adopt within their 
social context. Social roles may impact on the individual’s freedom to act 
from choice. For example, an individual may choose not to kill another 
human as part of their freely chosen moral behaviors, but may kill others 
in the social role of a combatant in war.  
Eshelman (2004) suggests that the most recent views on morality focus 
on responsibility as attributability and responsibility as accountability. 
Attributability is related to the notion of self and accountability to the concept of 
moral responsibility in a social context so that a behavior is ‘governed by an 
interpersonal normative standard of conduct that creates expectations between 
members of a shared community.’ Within this concept, holding someone 
responsible is essentially a social act, based on belonging to a shared moral 
community. Moral responsibility can be seen in this context as the extent to 
which individuals support or undermine the well-being of the community, 
suggesting that morality is indeed a culturally-determined set of norms and 
conformity to these is moral behaviors. This view is contested on the basis that 
we must not equate social conformity with morality, because one of the key 
aspects of developing morality is the development of moral reasoning.  
These debates reflect the uncertainties about how moral and social 
responsibility can be conceptualized and promoted within modern societies. 
Adrift from moral certainties and wary of merely promoting dominant cultural 
norms, the role of moral reasoning and the ability to rationally choose between 
moral values is fore fronted, but leaves us with a concern that such choices may 
lack a coherent value base or ‘morality’. The debate leaves us with the question 
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as to how we promote moral and social responsibility in young people as part 
of their learning in higher education in ways that promote moral reasoning but 
also develop values and ethical stances that go beyond, and can contest, the 
social norms of the times. 
 
D. Educating for Social and Moral Responsibility 
Hersch et al (1980:14) suggest that the purpose of moral education in the 
nineteenth century was to promote a ‘narrow form of socialization’. However, in 
the twentieth century this narrowness was challenged by philosophers such as 
Dewey (1909;1938) who argued that morality was a dynamic not static concept, 
linked to the changing values of modern democracies. Dewey believed that moral 
education needed to be rooted in the development of reasoning, not in training 
children to be dutiful to fixed moral rules. As such, Dewey’s arguments suggest 
that moral education and education per se are the same thing as they both involve 
the use of reason to resolve issues.  
However, liberal educationalists such as Dewey were challenged in their 
belief that learning the ability to rationally reflect on values was sufficient to 
develop moral responsibility. According to Carr (1999) liberal educationalists in a 
secular world sought to promote ‘rational moral autonomy’ to prepare 
individuals’ for their role in an individualistic market economy and to maximise 
the chances of positive life choices. This notion of morality is rooted in concepts of 
individual rights and reciprocal relationships between individuals rather than the 
absolute moral values of previous times. Jonathan (1999) suggests that liberal 
moral education supports the development of individuals as moral agents who are 
equipped to reflect on the range of values they encounter and make considered 
moral judgements about these. Kohlberg (1981) supports this approach through 
his theory of moral development. Theorising that moral development is achieved 
through stages in progress towards increasingly sophisticated moral reasoning 
signifies that such moral reasoning is the ‘central feature of morality and moral 
education.’ (Straughan 1982:19).   
Wilson (1990) argues that moral relativism does not make all 
values and beliefs arbitrary. He suggests that the answer to problems of 
relativity in moral thinking should be answered by closer focus on the 
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processes of thinking about and rationalising moral issues. However, Carr 
(1999: 38) concludes that liberal moral education, with its tolerance of a 
wide range of moral perspectives, excluding those which infringed on 
individual rights, failed to establish or explore ‘which human goals are 
worthier of pursuit than others’.  
Jonathan (1999) also states that the development of critical reasoning is not 
sufficient in moral education as it does not in itself provide the framework upon 
which to develop and structure moral values. However, responses to the 
perceived crisis of moral decline vary. Straughan (1982: 9) suggested that the 
perception that a moral vacuum had entered the classroom, as the declining 
influence of religion severed society from moral certainties, was a flawed concept. 
Straughan argues that the ‘moralistic argument ‘ is untenable as it is not possible to 
educate for moral certainties or to teach children ‘to be good’. Straughan suggests 
that educators affect value neutrality and value clarification to support the 
development of individual moral reasoning, in fact values are transmitted through 
in all educational institutions through pedagogical choices and practices. 
Wilcox and Ebbs (1992) suggest that the learning community is the key 
element in supporting the ‘scholar teacher/researcher’ to balance individual 
and group needs as they negotiate ‘teaching, discovery, application and 
integration.’ The learning community provides coherence to the experience of 
members and supports the development of an ethical basis for the institution 
as a whole. Learning communities can be described as: ‘an ideal type of higher 
education culture that seeks to overcome current tendencies toward individual 
alienation and intellectual fragmentation with regard to present academic 
specialization and special interests’. 
It is clear that the role of HEIs must go beyond simply supporting the 
development of rational thinking in students in value-free ways. The culture 
and ethos of the institution needs to promote the development of social and 
moral responsibility in more active and committed ways, which support the 
student to negotiate the competing demands of self and others. 
 
E. Ethos and Active Learning 
Dewey (1909; 1938) strongly advocated active learning approaches to 
moral education arguing that participation and reflection were the keys to 
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learning moral values. In this way, learning about morality becomes practicing 
moral behaviour in a variety of social situations. This view has implications for 
education in social and moral responsibility today, as according to Dewey, this 
simply cannot be achieved through classroom teaching, but must be achieved 
through collective participation in meaningful activities and institutions, which 
promote learning through experience, enquiry and reflection. 
Even if the teacher introduced concepts like democracy, justice, 
respect for others, and human rights, if the classroom and school structure 
continued to model and enforce authoritarian social relations, no effective 
learning would take place.’ (Hersch et al, 1980:21) 
McPhail (1982) suggests that Dewey’s ideas are relevant to pluralist 
societies in which moral values and bases may be contested and the rights of the 
individual and groups may at time conflict. Sandolow (1991) also suggests 
supporting student ‘character development’ through active learning that develops 
both student knowledge and their ability to think rationally, as a way forward 
from the apparent impasse in HEIs around moral development. 
Farbo (2006) also supports the introduction of engagement 
pedagogies but warned that they must not be merely seen as instructional 
innovation. HEIs must create the conditions for learning about moral and 
social issues through their structures and functions in order for this to be a 
meaningful experience. In his review of Dewey’s work Smith (2001) 
suggests that educational institutions need to reflect the ideals that they 
are supporting in their own structures and functions, by democratising 
relationships between students and teachers. Smith also cites Winch and 
Gingell (1999) who state that 'if schools exist to promote democratic values 
it would appear that they need to remove authoritarian relationships.' 
(Smith, 2001). It is difficult to see how this does not also apply to HEIs. 
Democratic relationships are only one aspect of effective learning 
communities for citizenship; Hersch and Schneider (2005) suggest that 
there needs to be a significant and ‘pervasive’ cultural change to ensure 
that HEIs can educate for moral responsibility. 
Nixon suggests that the way forward is a ‘new Aristotelianism’ 
(2004: 115) informed by both the Socratic idea of negative wisdom and the 
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moral imperative to take the ‘right action’. Negative wisdom involves the 
questioning of false assumptions and therefore involvement in rational 
debate, whereas the ‘right action’ implies involvement in social and 
community issues and living a ‘good’ life. Combining these two notions 
suggest that a ‘good’ life can be lived despite the lack of moral certainties. 
Within this notion, learning is associated with agency and social 
engagement. Students need to practise social and moral responsibility 
through engaging with others in learning about their world, rather than 
learn about citizenship issues in theory. Pedagogies that promote rational 
debate and reflection need to be promoted in the context of exploring 
social and moral issues in ‘real life’ contexts. In this way learning becomes 
the medium for social engagement and participation. 
 
F. Conclusion 
The effectiveness of HEIs in supporting the development of 
students’ social and moral responsibility rests on an holistic approach, 
encompassing the institutional ethos; culture; structures and pedagogies. 
While active learning focusing on engagement and rational debate can 
support the development of students’ ability to recognise and consider 
ethical issues, the environment in which this takes place must reflect an 
ethos that promotes positive relationships and values such as respect, 
honesty and caring.  
Mass market, consumerist approaches to higher education may fail to 
provide students with the necessary environment in which social and moral 
development can take place effectively. Students need opportunities to engage in 
learning communities that both respect their individuality and support their 
involvement with others in mutually created learning experiences that nurture 
debate and challenge their thinking. 
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